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abstract: Males and females have opposing interests when it comes
to the honesty of signals used in mate choice. The existence of this
sexual conflict has long been acknowledged, but its consequences
have not been fully investigated. By applying adaptive dynamics
methods and individual-based computer simulations to a standard
model for good-genes sexual selection, we show that sexual conflict
over condition-dependent signaling can prevent the handicap process
from ever attaining an evolutionary equilibrium. We outline the pa-
rameter conditions and properties of the underlying genetics con-
ducive to nonequilibrium behavior and discuss the potential of such
behavior to explain the elaboration and frequent phylogenetic loss
of sexually selected traits. We also evaluate its consequences for well-
established insights of sexual selection theory previously shown to
apply when female mating preference and male ornament expression
do converge on stable equilibrium levels. Contrary to equilibrium
expectation, a continual change of condition-dependent signaling
enables the evolution of a costly preference for a pure epistatic in-
dicator and the evolution of preferences for redundant signals or a
large number of independent ornaments. We thus conclude that
seemingly general results of sexual selection theory, insofar as these
are based on equilibrium considerations, do not extend to cases where
nonequilibrium behavior occurs.
Keywords: nonequilibrium dynamics, multiple ornaments, adaptive
dynamics, revealing handicap, condition-dependent handicap.
Why do females so often show mating preferences for
elaborate male ornaments that evidently reduce the male’s
viability? This question touches on one of the central issues
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in sexual selection theory, and it has led to the develop-
ment of several theories for the evolution of female mating
preferences (Andersson 1994). One widely held view (re-
viewed in Maynard Smith 1991) is that female choice based
on costly male traits is adaptive because the male orna-
ments, on which female preference acts, serve as indicators
of good genes.
There exists a conflict between the sexes over the reli-
ability of such indicators. Whereas female interests are
served by ornaments that reliably signal the genetic quality
of the male, it is in the interest of males to undermine the
association between the good genes and the expression of
the ornament as far as possible such that males that do
not carry the good genes are also able to attract females.
In view of this conflict, it has long been realized that the
signaling function of the ornament must be induced by
genetic or physiological processes that cannot easily be
modified without large costs (potential mechanisms are
discussed in, e.g., Clutton-Brock 1982; Hamilton and Zuk
1982; Møller 1990; Andersson 1994). In such a case, the
male ornament handicaps male survival in such a way that
cheating (i.e., expressing the ornament without carrying
the good genes) is costly (Zahavi 1975).
To capture the essence of this idea, early theoretical
models of the handicap process (e.g., Maynard Smith 1985;
Pomiankowski 1987; Andersson 1994 and references
therein) assume that the genetic and physiological archi-
tecture of the ornament dictates a fixed pattern of
condition-dependent ornament expression. By doing so,
the early models successfully provide proof of principle
that the handicap process can work. However, by imposing
a fixed relation between quality and ornament expression,
these models eliminate the sexual conflict over the reli-
ability of the ornament as an indicator of good genes, and
they do not address the issue of the maintenance of
condition-dependent signaling in a situation where males
can adapt their investment into the ornament in relation
to their own genetic quality.
As an important next step, Grafen (1990), Iwasa et al.
(1991), and Iwasa and Pomiankowski (1994) therefore in-
vestigated the evolution of optimal patterns of condition-
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dependent investment into the ornament. Two conclusions
can be drawn from their analyses. First, an optimal pattern
of condition-dependent investment maximizes the fitness
of males, irrespective of their quality, and not that of fe-
males. In particular, low-quality males will increase their
investment into the ornament as long as this increases
their reproductive success. This makes it more difficult for
females to distinguish high-quality from low-quality males.
Hence, the expression of the ornament by low-quality
males compromises the signaling function of the ornament
and the fitness of females. Second, condition-dependent
signaling will be maintained only when the ornament is
either a condition-dependent or a revealing handicap. By
definition (e.g., Iwasa et al. 1991), an ornament is a
condition-dependent indicator when it is more costly to
produce for low-quality males. An ornament is a revealing
indicator if its state reflects the condition of the male such
that the attractiveness of low-quality males is lower than
that of high-quality males, even if they invest equally into
the ornament. In both cases, the optimal level of invest-
ment is lower for low-quality males, either because the
cost of ornament expression increases more rapidly for
such males (condition-dependent handicap) or because
the benefit in terms of mating success increases more
slowly (revealing handicap).
It is by no means guaranteed that an optimal pattern
of condition-dependent ornament expression will actually
be realized in the course of evolution. Evolutionary sta-
bility (sensu Maynard Smith and Price 1973) and attain-
ability are independent properties (Geritz et al. 1998), and,
paradoxically, evolution may lead away from an evolu-
tionarily stable strategy (ESS; Abrams et al. 1993). Opti-
mality considerations (Grafen 1990; Iwasa et al. 1991)
should therefore be complemented by a stability analysis
based on evolutionary rates and dynamics. The relevance
of this point for sexual selection theory was illustrated by
Iwasa and Pomiankowski (1995), who observed evolu-
tionary cycling of mating characters in a Fisherian sexual
selection model. The instability of Fisher’s (1930) runaway
process underlying such continual evolution arises for cer-
tain (genetic) parameter values when the survival cost of
the male ornament is small around the viability selection
optimum and rapidly increasing beyond a certain level of
exaggeration. Although this particular instability is not
likely to affect handicap evolution—unless the variation
in male quality is small and the handicap process is not
very effective (Iwasa and Pomiankowski 1995, 1999)—it
is conceivable that other mechanisms could destabilize the
evolutionary equilibria of good-genes sexual selection. The
coevolutionary dynamics of condition dependence and
mating preference could well be such a mechanism, given
that more examples of continual coevolution between the
sexes driven by sexual conflict have been described (e.g.,
Rice 1996; Gavrilets 2000).
Iwasa and Pomiankowski (1994) were the first to study
the dynamics of condition dependence in good-genes sex-
ual selection. Their analysis concerns cases where the evo-
lutionary rate of change of the female mating preference
is small relative to that of the male condition-dependent
signaling strategy. Under that restriction, the evolution of
condition dependence will actually converge on the equi-
librium predicted by ESS analysis (Iwasa and Pomian-
kowski 1994), as can also be observed in various simu-
lation studies (e.g., Iwasa and Pomiankowski 1999; Houle
and Kondrashov 2002; Lorch et al. 2003). Houle and Kon-
drashov (2002), however, also show a simulation for dif-
ferent parameter values where the evolutionary outcome
deviates from what one would expect from optimality con-
siderations. In this simulation, the female mating prefer-
ence evolves at a relatively high rate. This apparently de-
stabilizes the feedback between the strategies of the two
sexes and results in continual evolutionary change in mat-
ing preference and ornament expression.
The sexual conflict inherent to the handicap process is
currently not fully understood, and the factors that de-
termine whether the evolution of mate choice and
condition-dependent signaling will settle on stable equi-
librium levels have not yet been systematically character-
ized. For that reason, a first objective of this article is to
study in detail the dynamics of condition dependence in
good-genes sexual selection. Our analysis will include se-
lective factors, such as the costs of choice or the reliability
of the ornament as a signal for quality, as well as genetic
details, such as the magnitude of mutational variances and
covariances. Both may qualitatively affect the attainability
of evolutionary equilibria (Matessi and Di Pasquale 1996).
A second objective of this article is to explore the con-
sequences of continual evolution in condition-dependent
signaling for some of the seemingly general insights offered
by theory on the evolution of mating preferences for good-
gene indicators. An example of such an insight is the con-
clusion that no stable exaggeration of costly female pref-
erence is possible when the ornament is a pure epistatic
indicator (Iwasa et al. 1991; Maynard Smith 1991). An-
other example is the conclusion that females should evolve
preferences for the single indicator of quality with the
highest reliability, honesty, and detectability and should
disregard ornaments that are inferior in these aspects
(Schluter and Price 1993). These insights are based on the
results of equilibrium analyses of the handicap process and
are therefore expected to apply when the evolutionary dy-
namics converges on a stable equilibrium. Whether they
also apply when the handicap process does not attain equi-
librium remains to be seen.
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An Overview of the Model and Some
Methodological Remarks
To investigate the combined action of good-genes sexual
selection and sexual conflict over condition-dependent sig-
naling, we analyze a formal model of the handicap process
with flexible male condition-dependent ornament expres-
sion (as in Iwasa and Pomiankowski 1994). We study the
evolution of four quantitative traits: genetic quality, female
mating preference for an ornament, and investment into
the ornament by high- and low-quality males. The genetic
quality of an individual affects its viability. Moreover, it
influences the costs of ornamentation and/or male attrac-
tiveness: the male ornament is a condition-dependent or
a revealing handicap. Female fitness depends on genetic
quality and the cost of choice. Male fitness depends on
genetic quality, the cost of ornament production, and male
mating success. The latter is determined—through mate
choice—by the preferences of females and the realized size
of the ornament.
We deviate from existing models in one aspect. Instead
of using a quantitative genetics framework (reviewed in
Mead and Arnold 2004) or an ESS analysis (e.g., Pen and
Weissing 2000), we use adaptive dynamics theory (Metz
et al. 1992; Dieckmann and Law 1996; Geritz et al. 1998;
Hofbauer and Sigmund 1998) to analyze the evolutionary
dynamics. This allows us to obtain explicit expressions for
the fitness gradients without having to consider the intri-
cate dependence of genetic variances and covariances on
the parameters of the model, as is necessary in quantitative
genetic models. Moreover, for the purpose of this study,
estimating equilibrium values of the genetic variances and
covariances as functions of the model parameters (Pom-
iankowski and Iwasa 1993) would not be sufficient. We
would have to keep track of their dynamics as well. Al-
though this is feasible (Barton and Turelli 1991), the pro-
cedure to do so is quite complicated and involves restric-
tive assumptions.
The adaptive dynamics method describes evolution as
a mutation-limited process. This approximation simplifies
the analysis of our model, but when applied to genetic
quality, it does not allow for the presence of variation in
this character. Because the handicap process relies on such
variation, we explicitly model deleterious mutations in ge-
netic quality. For the female preference and male sexual
characters, the assumption of mutation-limited evolution
has the consequence that we cannot address the effects of
genetic covariances between preferences and male char-
acters. Such covariances are instrumental in driving
Fisher’s runaway process of sexual selection (Fisher 1930).
Our analysis is therefore restricted to cases where the im-
pact of Fisher’s process on the evolutionary dynamics is
weak relative to that of the handicap process. The com-
plementary regime, which has been analyzed by Iwasa and
Pomiankowski (1999), is realized when males show low
variance in quality or when the effect of quality differences
on viability is small such that the handicap process is not
effective. Provided that the handicap process can work
effectively, our mutation-limited model of good-genes sex-
ual selection captures the essence of evolution in poly-
morphic populations with small genetic variation, as dem-
onstrated by the good quantitative agreement between the
predictions of the analytical model and individual-based
computer simulations (see below; cf. van Doorn and
Weissing 2004), which do not impose restrictions on the
magnitude of genetic covariances or the amount of genetic
variation present in the population.
The Model
Genetic Quality
We initially assume that an individual’s genetic quality can
be represented as a one-dimensional quantity. Genetic
quality is determined by an arbitrary number of diploid
loci, with two alleles at each locus (denoted A and a). The
allele A confers a higher quality; the allele a confers a lower
quality. Variation at the quality loci is maintained through
biased deleterious mutations, which convert A alleles into
a alleles. Deleterious mutations occur with probability m
per genome per generation.
To keep the model analytically tractable, we assume that
the rate of beneficial mutations, which convert a low-
quality to a high-quality allele, can be neglected relative
to the rate of deleterious mutations and that m is itself
small such that we may neglect the frequency of individuals
that carry more than one low-quality allele. Under these
simplifying assumptions, we need to keep track of the
frequencies of two different types of individuals: individ-
uals that carry only high-quality alleles (phenotype A) and
individuals that carry a deleterious mutation at one of their
quality loci (phenotype a). Throughout this article, the
index k will be used to refer to these quality phenotypes
(i.e., or a).kp A
Viability Selection
We assume that generations are discrete and nonoverlap-
ping. Viability selection acts at the start of every genera-
tion, before reproduction. Individual survival probabilities
vary with the individual’s general (i.e., good-genes-
induced) viability, which is determined by the individual’s
genetic quality. The general viabilities associated with the
different quality phenotypes are defined by the parameters
, where .v v 1 vk A a
Survival probabilities are also affected by the costs as-
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sociated with the expression of preferences (for females)
or ornaments (for males). These factors are assumed to
interact multiplicatively with general viability. The cost of
choice varies with female preference p. Females with larger
absolute values of p exert stronger mating preferences (see
below); females with mate at random, which, bypp 0
assumption, minimizes the costs of choice. Specifically, we
take the survival probability for females with quality phe-
notype k, , asfv (p)k
f f 2v (p)p v v (p)p v exp (gp ), (1)k k k
where the function measures the costf 2v (p)p exp (gp )
of choice and the parameter g determines how rapidly
viability decreases with the strength of preference.
For males with quality phenotype k, the survival prob-
ability is given by , wheremv (t )kk
m 2v (t )p v exp (b t ). (2)k k kk k
The second factor on the right-hand side incorporates the
cost of ornament production. It varies with tk, the male’s
investment of resources into the ornament. The pheno-
typic characters tk are expressed relative to the value op-
timal for male survival (also implying that negative values
of tk are biologically meaningful) such that is thet p 0k
optimal investment into the ornament when only viability
selection is considered. As implied by the index k, male
investment into the ornament is condition dependent; that
is, males may invest more or less resources into the or-
nament, depending on their genetic quality. In addition
to this indirect dependence of viability on genetic quality,
we allow for the possibility that the male’s genetic quality
directly influences the cost of ornament production, as is
commonly assumed in condition-dependent handicap
models. The parameters bk determine the intensity of sta-
bilizing selection on the investment of resources into the
ornament. In general, , but when the ornament isb ≥ ba A
a condition-dependent handicap, . The viability ofb 1 ba A
low-quality males is then more severely compromised by
ornament expression than is that of high-quality males,
even when both types of males would invest equally into
the ornament.
Mate Choice
For the sake of concreteness, let us suppose that females
evaluate males based on the realized size, Sk(tk), of their
ornament. Ornament size is again expressed relative to the
value optimal for male survival. Males that invest more
into their ornament will produce a larger ornament.
Hence, Sk(tk) is an increasing function of tk. In addition,
we allow for the possibility that the realized size of an
ornament is directly affected by the quality of the male,
as is commonly assumed in revealing handicap models.
Before she mates, a female evaluates the available males
based on the size of their ornaments and her own pref-
erences. Females have a higher probability of mating with
an attractive male, where attractiveness is quantified by a
function rk. The attractiveness of a male with quality phe-
notype k is proportional to
r (p, t )p exp [pS (t )]. (3)k k k k
In this mate choice model, also known as the psycho-
physical or open-ended model of mate preference (Lande
1981), positive values of p indicate preferences for larger
ornaments, negative values of p indicate preferences for
smaller ornaments, and females with mate at ran-pp 0
dom. A female mates only once. The probability that a
given male is allowed to father her offspring is determined
by the male’s attractiveness relative to the average attrac-
tiveness of the other males present in the population.
For all males, the realized size of an ornament is pro-
portional to the investment into that ornament. Yet, if the
ornament is a revealing indicator of quality, low-quality
males must invest more to attain the same level of or-
nament elaboration and, hence, attractiveness. Therefore,
we assume that
S (t )p t a . (4)k k k k
The parameters ak reflect how efficiently male investment
into the ornament translates into a larger (more attractive)
ornament for a male with quality phenotype k. All else
being equal, high-quality males are more attractive than
low-quality males or, at the very least, are equally attrac-
tive. Hence, .a ≥ aA a
Information Content
The values of the parameters ak and bk depend on a variety
of biological factors, such as female perception, the phys-
iology of male ornament production, and the ecological
setting of mate choice. From the male’s point of view,
these parameters determine the attractiveness gain and
survival cost of trait investment for low- and high-quality
males, respectively. They therefore determine how easily a
male can produce an elaborate ornament without actually
carrying high-quality alleles. From the female’s point of
view, the parameters ak and bk determine how easily a
female can discriminate between high- and low-quality
males. To characterize ornaments in this respect, we will
use the term “information content”; we will say that an
ornament has high information content if a low level of
preference is sufficient to accurately distinguish high-
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quality from low-quality males and low information con-
tent if females have to evolve high levels of preference to
do so.
The information content of an ornament is determined
by two factors. First, it depends on the constraints on male
condition-dependent signaling that arise from the genetic
and physiological architecture of the male ornament. Such
constraints are captured by the parameters ak and bk,
which therefore directly determine what one could call the
intrinsic information content of the ornament. For ex-
ample, when and , the ornament intrin-a 1 a b p bA a A a
sically provides information about genetic quality through
a revealing handicap mechanism; when anda p aA a
, it does so through a condition-dependent hand-b ! bA a
icap mechanism; and finally, when and , thea 1 a b ! bA a A a
ornament is a revealing and a condition-dependent hand-
icap at the same time. In contrast, the ornament does not
intrinsically provide information about genetic quality
when and (in this case, the ornament isa p a b p bA a A a
a pure epistatic indicator; Maynard Smith 1991). We em-
phasize that our use of the terms “revealing handicap,”
“condition-dependent handicap,” and “epistatic indicator”
always refers to the intrinsic information content of the
ornament and not necessarily to its realized information
content.
Indeed, the realized information content of the orna-
ment could be different from its intrinsic information con-
tent, as a result of the condition-dependent signaling strat-
egy of males. The distribution of the male strategic
variables tk thus constitutes a second factor to impinge on
the information content. For example, if the ornament is
a pure epistatic indicator, it may still convey information
about genetic quality if, for some reason, low-quality males
invest less into the ornament than high-quality males. Al-
ternatively, if the ornament is a revealing handicap, it may
still provide no information whatsoever about quality if
low-quality males invest more into the ornament than
high-quality males such that they compensate exactly for
their reduced attractiveness.
In these two examples, the realized information content
of the ornament is larger or smaller, respectively, than its
intrinsic information content. It is clear that further evo-
lution will take place whenever such discrepancies exist.
For example, if the realized information content is higher
than the intrinsic information content of the ornament,
low-quality males could easily increase their mating suc-
cess by evolving stronger expression of the ornament. In
the opposite case, low-quality males experience relatively
high costs of signaling, and they are expected to reduce
their investment into the ornament. Intuitively, one would
expect the realized information content of an ornament
to agree with its intrinsic information content in evolu-
tionary equilibrium. Indeed, in the following section, we
demonstrate how this intuition can be formalized. This
does not imply, however, that such an equilibrium will
ever be attained in the course of evolution. This issue will
be addressed in “Evolutionary Dynamics and the Stability
of Equilibria.”
Evolutionary Equilibria
We study the long-term evolution of the female mating
preference and the pattern of condition-dependent or-
nament expression in males by considering evolution as
a sequence of mutation and allele substitution events. Fol-
lowing the standard assumptions of adaptive dynamics
theory (e.g., Geritz et al. 1998), we assume that the genes
coding for the female preference and investment into the
ornament by males mutate only rarely. This allows us to
focus on a population with negligible variation for these
traits. We then consider an initially rare mutant allele that
causes individuals to differ slightly in one of their phe-
notypic components from the resident individuals, and we
investigate whether this mutant allele will be able to in-
crease in frequency. Mathematically, the potential for the
mutant allele to spread is determined by the mutant’s
invasion fitness l, that is, by the long-term geometric rate
of increase of the mutant allele frequency in the context
set by the current resident alleles (Metz et al. 1992). The
mutant will spread if its geometric rate of increase is pos-
itive, that is, when its invasion fitness is larger than that
of the resident allele.
The fitness difference between mutant and resident al-
leles is approximated by the gradient of the invasion fitness
function. Hence, this gradient determines the direction of
evolutionary change. If the selection gradient is positive,
subsequent mutation and trait substitution events will lead
to an increase of the trait under consideration (and vice
versa if it is negative).
General Properties of Evolutionary Equilibria
A derivation of the invasion fitness function and its gra-
dients with respect to the different evolutionary characters
is given in appendix A in the online edition of the American
Naturalist. Only the end result of this derivation is given
here. The selection gradients with respect to the male char-
acters, denoted , are given byl tk
ml  ln [r (p, t )v (t )]k k kk
l p p b , (5)t kk t tk k
where the coefficients bk are strictly positive (see app. A).
Under suitable assumptions, evolution proceeds in a
direction correlated with the direction of the selection gra-
dient (Dieckmann and Law 1996; Weissing 1996; Hofbauer
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and Sigmund 1998). Potential endpoints of evolution are
therefore points where the selection gradient vanishes (i.e.,
points where ). In view of equation (5), malel p 0tk
condition-dependent investment into the ornament will
therefore evolve to maximize , the product ofkr (p, t )v (t )k k km
male attractiveness and male survival for each male quality
phenotype. Under quite general assumptions on the func-
tions rk and , this implies that in equilibrium, low-quality
mvk
males will invest less resources into the ornament because
the cost of ornamentation increases more rapidly for such
males (condition-dependent handicap), because attrac-
tiveness increases less rapidly (revealing handicap), or be-
cause both of these mechanisms act at the same time.
A similar intuitive interpretation can be given for lp,
the selection gradient with respect to female preference.
In appendix A, we derive that
fl 1  ln [v (p)] 1  ln [R(p, t , t )]A a
l p p  mw , (6)p
p 2 p 2 p
where w is the reproductive value of males that carry a
low-quality allele and the function R measures the attrac-
tiveness of high-quality males relative to that of males
carrying a deleterious mutation; that is,
r (p, t )A AR(p, t , t )p . (7)A a r (p, t )a a
According to equation (6), female preference will evolve
away from its viability selection optimum (i.e., to a point
where is negative) only if mutation bias cre-f ln [v (p)]/p
ates variation among males ( ) and is largerm 1 0  ln (R)/p
than 0 (for the moment, we suppose, without loss of gen-
erality, that p, tA, and ta are positive).
The latter term has an interesting biological interpre-
tation. For females that mate at random, low-quality males
are, by definition, as attractive as high-quality males. To
females that exhibit stronger preferences, however, high-
quality males will appear increasingly attractive because
such males invest more into their ornament (this is to be
expected when the ornament is a condition-dependent
handicap) or because the ornament is a revealing indicator.
Therefore, R is a monotonically increasing function of p.
The term represents the rate at which the rel- ln (R)/p
ative attractiveness of high-quality males increases with
female preference, and it reflects the detectability of quality
differences. It is related to the realized information content
of the ornament, which we define as the detectability of
quality differences relative to the level of choosiness, that
is, .1/p 7  ln (R)/p
If is only slightly larger than 0, the relative ln (R)/p
attractiveness of high-quality males increases only slowly
with preference, even when female preference is already
high. Therefore, females must evolve high levels of choos-
iness before they can accurately distinguish high-quality
from low-quality males. In this situation, the realized in-
formation content of the ornament is low, meaning that
the ornament is a poor indicator for genetic quality. On
the other hand, when is large, even low levels ln (R)/p
of choosiness will allow females to select high-quality
males. In this case, the ornament has a high realized in-
formation content.
Evolutionary Equilibria for Our Specific Model
After these general considerations, we now return to the
specific model defined earlier. Hence, we substitute specific
functions for rk, , and , as defined in equations (1)–
m fv vk
(4). This immediately yields simple expressions for the
equilibrium investment of resources into the ornament by
males, and :∗ ∗t tA a
ak∗ ∗t p p . (8)k 2bk
Depending on whether the ornament is a revealing indi-
cator or a condition-dependent handicap, either ak is
smaller or bk is larger for low-quality males. For both types
of handicaps and at equilibrium, low-quality males will
therefore invest less into their ornaments.
The equilibrium female preference, , cannot be ob-∗p
tained in a simple explicit form. From equation (6), it
follows that
f ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ln [v (p )]  ln [R(p , t , t )]A a∗ p mw , (9)∗ ∗p p
which implies that
∗ ∗ ∗1  ln [R(p , t , t )]A a∗ ∗ ∗2gp p mw p . (10)∗ ∗{ }p p
As indicated by the asterisk, the reproductive value is∗w
a function of (see app. A). The factor between fences∗p
on the right-hand side is the realized information content
of the ornament in equilibrium. When it is 0, there can
be no stable costly mate preference (in this case, the only
equilibrium solution is ).∗p p 0
We now use equations (7) and (8) to find that the
realized information content of the ornament in equilib-
rium equals
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∗ ∗ ∗1  ln [R(p , t , t )] 1A a ∗ ∗p (a t  a t )A A a a∗ ∗ ∗p p p
2 2a aA ap  . (11)
2b 2bA a
We interpret the constant on the right-hand side as the
intrinsic information content of the ornament because it
depends only on the inherent characteristics of the or-
nament that are represented by the parameters ak and bk
and not on the male signaling strategy. Equation (11) cor-
roborates the intuition that the realized information con-
tent of an ornament (on the left-hand side) should equal
its intrinsic information content (on the right-hand side)
in evolutionary equilibrium. When the ornament is a re-
vealing handicap ( ), a condition-dependent hand-a 1 aA a
icap ( ), or both at the same time, the intrinsic in-b ! bA a
formation content of the ornament is strictly positive.
Contrastingly, when and , the ornamenta p a b p bA a A a
is a pure epistatic indicator, and its intrinsic information
content is 0.
From equations (8) and (10), it is easy to see that there
always exists a trivial equilibrium at which∗ ∗p p t p 0k
females mate at random. In addition, there exists a pair
of nontrivial equilibria ( , ) where females∗ ˜ ˜p pp p 1 0
choose males with costly ornaments when
2 2a /(2b ) a /(2b )A A a a2g ! m , (12)
2(v /v ) 1A a
that is, when the intensity of sexual selection for increased
choosiness outweighs the intensity of stabilizing viability
selection on female preference.
Evolutionary Dynamics and the Stability of Equilibria
In the previous section, we identified evolutionary equi-
libria by searching for points at which the selection gra-
dients vanish. To determine whether evolution will actually
proceed toward these equilibria, we must determine the
stability properties of the equilibria. This requires us to
be more specific about the actual evolutionary dynamics
of the female preference and the male investment pattern.
The evolutionary dynamics of traits is determined not
only by the direction of the selection gradient but also by
genetic factors (Matessi and Di Pasquale 1996; Weissing
1996). In quantitative genetics models, for example, these
genetic factors are incorporated by a genetic variance-
covariance matrix, which determines how easily selection
can lead to an evolutionary response in a specific phe-
notypic direction. In adaptive dynamics models, the ge-
netic variance-covariance matrix does not play a role be-
cause evolution is assumed to be mutation limited. Instead,
adaptive dynamics models have to deal with genetic con-
straints imposed by the mutation process. For example,
evolution may preferentially proceed in certain phenotypic
directions because of the fact that mutations are more
likely to result in phenotypic deviations in these directions.
Alternatively, selection on one trait may lead to a correlated
response in another because of the fact that mutations of
the one trait have pleiotropic effects on the other.
Indeed, following Dieckmann and Law (1996), the evo-
lutionary rate of change in the female preference p and
the male investment strategy tk is given by
p lp   d
t p rG l , (13)A tA   dt t l   a ta
where the matrix G is the mutational variance-covariance
matrix, which contains as elements the mutational vari-
ances and covariances of the different traits. The propor-
tionality constant r scales the rate of evolution with the
rate at which beneficial mutations arise (r depends on the
population size and the mutation rate; Dieckmann and
Law 1996). Finally, t represents evolutionary time. A unit
of evolutionary time roughly corresponds to the genera-
tion time if mutation creates, on average, a single new
mutant phenotype per generation in the entire population;
it is of the order of one-tenth of the generation time, when
mutation creates on average 10 new mutant phenotypes
per generation, and so on.
Mutations with Pleiotropic Effects
In view of equation (13), the attainability, or convergence
stability, of equilibria depends on the direction of selection
in the vicinity of the equilibrium. An equilibrium is bound
to be convergence stable when the selection gradients point
toward the equilibrium from whatever direction it is ap-
proached (Leimar 2001). However, if this is not the case,
convergence stability may be qualitatively affected by the
underlying genetics (Matessi and Di Pasquale 1996). This
implies that an equilibrium may be attained only if the
mutational variance-covariance matrix satisfies certain
conditions.
As illustrated in figure 1, this is especially relevant for
our model. The figure shows two numerical simulations
of the dynamical system (13) (see eq. [B1] in app. B in
the online edition of the American Naturalist) that differ
only with respect to the mutational variance-covariance
matrix G. For the sake of concreteness, we supposed that
the female preference p and the male investment strategies
tk are encoded by a large number of genes and that a
fraction f of the male investment genes is expressed ir-
respective of the genetic quality of the male. Hence, a
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Figure 1: Genetic details influence the stability of equilibria. Top, female
preference and male investment into the ornament reach a stable equi-
librium where females are choosy and where males develop costly or-
namentation. The equilibrium loses its stability when the pleiotropic
effects of mutations in male investment genes are decreased. Bottom,
simulation starts from initial conditions close to the equilibrium. Female
preference and male investment levels diverge from the equilibrium until
they eventually attain a stable limit cycle. Parameters are ,a p 5.0A
, , , , , and .a p 4.0 b p b p 0.5 gp 0.05 mp 0.05 v p 1.0 v p 0.5a A a A a
Figure 2: Continual evolution along a limit cycle. Sexual conflict over
the information content of the ornament drives the female preference
and the male investment strategy along a limit cycle (black curve). White
circles are plotted at regular time intervals to give an indication of the
rate of evolution along the cycle. Gray trajectories connect the trivial and
nontrivial equilibria to one another and to the limit cycle. The dotted
line marks the optimal investment of resources into the ornament by
low-quality males for any given level of female preference. Parameters
are as in figure 1.
mutation in one of these genes has pleiotropic effects on
the characters tA and ta simultaneously. These pleiotropic
effects enter the matrix G as mutational covariances (app.
B).
If the mutational covariance between the male invest-
ment genes is large enough, evolution converges on a sta-
ble nontrivial equilibrium, as in figure 1 (top), where
. In equilibrium, a stable level of female preferencefp 0.4
is attained, and also the male investment pattern reaches
a stable state where (this is becauset p 4/5t a pa A a
and ; cf. eq. [8]). However, when we decrease4/5a b p bA a A
the overlap between the male ornament genes, the equi-
librium loses its stability (fig. 1, bottom; ). Insteadfp 0.3
of attaining stable equilibrium values, the female prefer-
ence and the investment into the ornament by males now
continue to fluctuate and eventually approach a stable limit
cycle. This limit cycle is projected in figure 2 (black curve),
together with some illustrative trajectories (gray) that con-
nect the different equilibria to one another and to the limit
cycle. In this figure, p and tA are both represented on the
horizontal axis. This is possible because tA is always close
to its quasiequilibrium value (eq. [8]) and, hence, pro-
portional to p (see also fig. 1, where the lines representing
p and tA are virtually overlapping).
The continual evolution of the female mating preference
and the male condition-dependent investment pattern
along the limit cycle is driven by a sexual conflict over the
information content of the ornament. Such a conflict can
arise when there is a potentially large discrepancy between
the realized and intrinsic information contents of the or-
nament. Indeed, in the simulations shown in figures 1 and
2, we assumed that the ornament was a revealing indicator
with a low intrinsic information content. This does not
necessarily imply, however, that females can never use the
This content downloaded from 129.125.148.019 on November 12, 2018 07:22:51 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
750 The American Naturalist
ornament to gain accurate information about genetic qual-
ity. Imagine, for example, that female preference is weak
and that for some reason , as is the case at point At ! ta A
in figure 2. In this situation, females benefit from evolving
preference because females can very easily discriminate
between high- and low-quality males based on the orna-
ment. This is not so much because the ornament intrin-
sically provides a lot of information about quality but
rather because of the pattern of condition-dependent in-
vestment that is currently adopted by the male population.
In view of the high realized information content of the
ornament, it is not surprising that females rapidly evolve
preference for the ornament up to the level where the
benefit of choice is balanced by the cost (fig. 2, point B).
Along with the increase of female choosiness, males in-
crease their investment into the ornament, as one would
predict based on equation (8). Because the ornament is
an indicator that reveals only limited information about
quality ( and ), one would expect thisa p 4/5a b p ba A a A
to lead to a situation where , as in figure 1 (top).t p 4/5ta A
Although this situation is eventually attained (fig. 2, point
D; the dotted line is to indicate all points where t pa
), it is approached only slowly. Apparently, the male4/5tA
character ta evolves at a very low rate. This has an im-
portant consequence: for a long time, the ornament con-
tinues to function as an indicator with a high realized
information content, even though its intrinsic information
content is low.
There are two reasons for the low rate of evolution of
the male character ta. First, ta is expressed only in low-
quality males. The frequency of such males is of the order
of the mutation rate m such that ta is hardly exposed to
selection. Second, selection on the other male characters
only weakly affects ta (through pleiotropic mutations) be-
cause the overlap between male investment genes is low
( in fig. 2).fp 0.3
Even though the male character ta approaches its op-
timal value only slowly, low-quality males will inevitably
catch up with the high-quality males. The realized infor-
mation content of the ornament will therefore eventually
decrease to match the intrinsic information content (fig.
2, point D). Initially (fig. 2, between points B and C),
females respond to the gradual erosion of the realized
information content of the ornament by evolving stronger
preferences. By doing so, females can continue to distin-
guish between high- and low-quality males, even though
the difference between these males has become smaller (cf.
Hill 1994). Eventually, this strategy turns out to be fruitless.
Evolving stronger preferences yields higher costs of choice,
whereas it cannot prevent the benefit of choice from grad-
ually being eroded further. In the end, females have
evolved strong preferences for an ornament that now pro-
vides only rather limited information about genetic quality.
The costs of choice are no longer balanced by the benefits,
and the female preference collapses (fig. 2, point C).
The decrease of female preference is immediately
tracked by a reduction of the investment by high-quality
males. Low-quality males again respond much more
slowly. Beyond point D in figure 2, low-quality males invest
even more resources into their ornament than high-quality
males. This provides an additional selection pressure for
the females to lower their preference for the ornament
until it is lost completely (fig. 2, point ). From this point′A
onward, the whole process repeats itself in the other
direction.
Individual-Based Computer Simulations
Formally, our deterministic mathematical model (sum-
marized by eq. [13]) offers an exact description of the
evolutionary dynamics of the female preference p and the
male investment strategies tk only under highly idealized
circumstances (e.g., evolution must be mutation limited,
and inheritance of the evolving characters should be based
on additive haploid genetics). To investigate to what extent
the dynamics defined by equation (13) is representative
for the outcome of evolution under less idealized condi-
tions, we implemented our model as a genetically explicit,
stochastic, individual-based simulation program (app. B).
Individual-based simulations can potentially deal with ar-
bitrarily complex genetics and do not impose restrictions
on the magnitude of genetic covariances or the amount
of genetic variation present in the population.
Figure 3 shows data from an individual-based simula-
tion run (solid lines). We used the same model parameters
as in figures 1 and 2, except that tA and ta were assumed
to be coded by nonoverlapping sets of genes; that is,
. As in the deterministic version of the model, thefp 0
individual-based simulations show a continual evolution
of the female mating preference and the male investment
strategy along a limit cycle. This illustrates that the oc-
currence of nonequilibrium dynamics does not critically
rely on the simplifying assumptions underlying our math-
ematical analysis.
Beyond the mere qualitative agreement, the two versions
of the model actually generate quantitatively comparable
predictions for the evolutionary trajectories. Both the am-
plitude and the period of the oscillations observed in the
individual-based simulation match well with the predic-
tions from the deterministic model. This is clearly ob-
servable in figure 3, where the dashed lines show numerical
solutions of equation (13) for exactly the parameter con-
ditions used in the individual-based simulations (app. B).
The fit between the individual-based simulation results
and the predictions based on the deterministic model de-
teriorates when the effects of stochasticity become more
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Figure 3: Continual evolution in an individual-based simulation. The
evolutionary dynamics of the female preference and male investment
strategy was investigated by means of an individual-based simulation
program (app. B in the online edition of the American Naturalist). Solid
lines show the evolution of the population averages of p, tA, and ta through
time (the population size in the simulation was set at 5,000 individuals).
As in the deterministic model, the lines representing the averages of p
and tA are virtually overlapping. Dashed lines show numerical solutions
of the deterministic model (eq. [13]). The parameter conditions that
were used in the individual-based simulations (see fig. 1; ) werefp 0
also used in the deterministic model. Also, the mutational variance-
covariance matrix G and the proportionality constant r that appear in
equation (13) were a priori derived from the parameters of the individual-
based simulations (app. B).
pronounced. For example, individual-based simulations
for smaller population sizes do show oscillatory behavior,
but the period of the evolutionary cycles is less regular.
This observation highlights the considerable effect that
stochasticity could have on the evolutionary response to
sexual selection, but it does not lead us to doubt the general
robustness of the conclusions based on the mutation-
limited deterministic approach. Because the latter is much
more accessible to further analysis than an approach based
on individual-based simulations, we will concentrate on
the deterministic version of our model (eq. [13]) from
here on.
An Exploration of Different Parameter Conditions
Because of the large number of parameters, it is hard to
characterize the behavior of the model under a wide range
of conditions. We therefore reduced the number of pa-
rameters by rescaling the model (app. B). By doing so, we
were able to identify dimensionless combinations of pa-
rameters that govern the model’s behavior.
In figure 4A, we systematically varied two of these di-
mensionless parameter combinations. Along the vertical
axis, we varied c, the relative cost of choice; along the
horizontal axis, we varied V, the typical rate of evolution
of the male characters relative to that of the female
preference.
These dimensionless parameters are defined as follows:
4gbAcp ,
2maA
2Var (t ) 4bA AVp . (14)
2Var (p) aA
The relative cost of choice c measures the intensity of
viability selection on female preference, which is quantified
by 2g, relative to that of sexual selection, which is quan-
tified by . The coefficients and2ma /(2b ) Var (t ) Var (p)A A A
that appear in the definition of V are the mutational var-
iances of the male character tA and the female preference,
respectively. When such that V is large,Var (t ) k Var (p)A
comparable intensities of selection on tA and p lead to a
much larger phenotypic change in the male character per
generation and, hence, to a larger rate of evolution of this
character. Contrastingly, when V is small, mutation is more
likely to create variation in female preference such that
the evolutionary rate of change of p is larger than that of
tA, provided, of course, that both characters experience
selection of comparable intensity.
Roughly speaking, the dynamics of the model can be
one of four qualitatively different types. As illustrated in
figure 4A, all of these types may occur when V and c are
varied. The figure is subdivided into four large regions
(regions 1–4), and the dynamics of the model within a
region is represented by the schematic phase portraits (cf.
fig. 2) shown within that region. The regions are separated
by boundary lines, which correspond to combinations of
V and c where a qualitative change occurs in the stability
or the number of equilibria (local bifurcation lines; black)
or where limit cycles appear or disappear through global
bifurcations (gray lines).
In region 1 of figure 4A, where V is large and c is small,
the dynamics is as in figure 1 (top); that is, evolution
converges on a stable nontrivial equilibrium where females
are choosy and where males develop a costly ornament.
The equilibrium is destabilized when the relative rate of
male evolution V is decreased. We then enter region 2,
where the female preference and the male investment strat-
egy evolve continuously along a limit cycle, as in figures
1 (bottom) and 2. The mechanism responsible for the ap-
pearance of oscillations is a classical one: by decreasing
the relative rate of male evolution, we lower the rate at
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Figure 4: Model behavior under different parameter conditions. The
dynamics of the model can be one of four types (see the main text),
which each occur within a specific region (1–4) of parameter space. In
A–C, we vary different combinations of parameters. Black lines demarcate
points where the number or stability of equilibria changes through local
bifurcations; gray lines (often very close to local bifurcation lines) de-
marcate points where limit cycles appear or disappear through global
bifurcations. Gray areas extend over biologically unrealistic parameter
combinations. The dynamics within each region is characterized by a
representative phase portrait (as in fig. 2). In these phase portraits, black
lines indicate stable limit cycles, and circles mark equilibrium points (gray
is used for the trivial equilibrium, black for the nontrivial equilibrium;
filled circles indicate stable equilibria; open symbols indicate unstable
equilibria). Except when a parameter combination was varied, we used
the values , , , ,a /a p b /b p 0.9 v /v p 0.7 cp 0.1 Vp 0.15 mpa A A a a A
, , and .0.01 Var (t )/ Var (t )p 1.0 Cov (t , t )/ Var (t )p 0.1a A A a A
which males respond to changes in the female preference.
This effectively introduces a delay in the feedback between
the evolution of female preference and male condition-
dependent investment (it is well known from engineering
that systems with delayed feedbacks are prone to exhibit
oscillatory behavior).
Changes in the relative cost of choice predominantly
influence the number of equilibria. Figure 4A illustrates
that the nontrivial equilibria (i.e., the equilibria at which
females exert costly mate preference) disappear as soon as
the relative cost of choice becomes larger than a certain
threshold value (cf. eq. [12]). Hence, we find convergence
to the trivial equilibrium (i.e., the equilibrium where fe-
males mate at random and where males do not express a
costly ornament) in region 4 and oscillations around the
trivial equilibrium in region 3. The model’s behavior in
region 3 illustrates again that predictions based on equi-
librium considerations can be misleading: although the
cost of choice is high relative to the intrinsic information
content of the ornament and although one would therefore
not expect females to evolve mating preferences, it is ob-
vious that the cost of choice is not minimized in region
3. Because of the continual change of mating preferences,
the realized information content of the ornament is above
its intrinsic information content for most of the time. As
a consequence, the average benefit of choice is larger than
one would expect from equilibrium considerations. This
also explains why female choosiness can evolve when the
relative costs of choice are higher than the threshold level
determined by equation (12).
The same four types of dynamical behavior are found
when other parameters are varied (the labeling of the
regions in fig. 4B and 4C corresponds to the labeling used
in fig. 4A). In figure 4B, for example, we vary the relative
genetic covariance between the male characters (on the
horizontal axis) and their mutational variances relative to
one another (on the vertical axis). The gray background
extends over biologically unrealistic parameter combina-
tions (app. B). From figure 4B, we conclude that continual
evolution of the female preference and the male invest-
ment pattern is likely when the male characters evolve
independently ( ) or when mutations typ-Cov (t , t )p 0A a
ically affect the male characters in opposite phenotypic
directions ( ). This agrees with the resultsCov (t , t ) ! 0A a
shown in figure 1, where a decrease of the mutational
covariance between male characters (the parameter f) gave
rise to oscillatory dynamics. Likewise, continual evolution
is more likely when the mutational variance of the char-
acter ta is low such that this character can evolve only
slowly. Again, this will destabilize the evolutionary feed-
back through introducing a longer delay in the evolution-
ary response by low-quality males.
Figure 4C, finally, features the same configuration of
regions and bifurcation lines as figure 4A. In figure 4C,
we vary the intrinsic information content of the ornament.
Along the horizontal axis, we vary the relative coefficients
of attractiveness ( for a revealing handicap).a /a ! 1a A
Along the vertical axis, we vary the relative coefficients for
the cost of ornamentation ( for a condition-b /b ! 1A a
dependent handicap). The gray region extends over irrel-
evant parameter combinations. At the border of the gray
region, the ornament is a pure epistatic indicator that does
not intrinsically provide information about quality. The
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intrinsic information content of the ornament increases
as one moves downward or toward the left in the plot.
The potential discrepancy between the realized and in-
trinsic information content of the ornament, which is re-
sponsible for the observed evolutionary cycling of the fe-
male preference and the male investment strategy, can be
large only when the intrinsic information content of the
ornament is low. Otherwise, deviations from the optimal
male investment pattern would be too costly to persist
over a long time. This agrees with figure 4C, where con-
tinual evolution of female preferences (regions 2 and 3)
is restricted to the area in parameter space where the in-
trinsic information content of the ornament is low. In the
remaining areas, equilibrium analysis correctly predicts the
outcome of evolution. In addition, we can draw the con-
clusion that both revealing and condition-dependent mod-
els may exhibit oscillatory behavior.
Multiple Viability Components, Multiple Ornaments
In this section, we investigate two extensions of our model
in order to illustrate some of the potential consequences
of sexual conflict over the information content of signals
in more complex settings.
Multiple Viability Components
Our first extension concerns our assumption that genetic
quality can be represented as a one-dimensional quantity.
Although this is a standard assumption, made in many
models of sexual selection on good genes (for exceptions,
see Johnstone 1996; van Doorn and Weissing 2004), it is
usually the case that genetic quality has several indepen-
dent aspects (e.g., Doucet and Montgomerie 2003).
To explore the consequences of this complication, we
extend our model by introducing a second set of quality
genes that influence genetic quality. To be precise, we as-
sume that genetic quality is determined by two distinct
quality components (instead of one), denoted A and B.
These quality components represent, for example, toler-
ance to harmful substances in the environment and re-
sistance against parasites. Each of the quality components
is determined by many loci with two alleles (A and a for
the first quality component; B and b for the second). As
in the original model, we assume that deleterious muta-
tions maintain variation in both quality components but
that they are sufficiently rare such that we may neglect the
frequency of individuals that carry more than one dele-
terious mutation. Under these assumptions, we must keep
track of the frequencies of three types of individuals: high-
quality individuals that carry no deleterious mutations (AB
individuals), low-quality individuals that carry an a allele
(aB individuals), and low-quality individuals that carry a
b allele (Ab individuals). Males can vary their investment
into the ornament depending on their quality for each of
the quality components. The levels of investment by the
three types of males are denoted tAB, taB, and tAb.
A derivation of the invasion fitness and the selection
gradients for this extended model follows a procedure sim-
ilar to the one given in appendix A for our original model
(details are available from the authors). The main differ-
ence between the extended and the original model is that
the selection gradient with respect to the female preference
now contains two separate contributions to the benefit of
choice, one for each quality component. To be exact (cf.
eq. [6]),
f1  ln [v (p)] 1  ln [R (p, t , t )]A AB aB
l p  m wp A A2 p 2 p
1  ln [R (p, t , t )]B AB Ab m w , (15)B B2 p
where mK denotes the rate of deleterious mutations in qual-
ity component K ( or B), wK is the reproductiveKp A
value of a males with a low quality for component K, and
RK denotes the attractiveness of a high-quality male relative
to that of a male with a low quality for component K.
In a model with multiple quality components, it is pos-
sible that the ornament is a signal with a high intrinsic
information content for one component of quality and a
low intrinsic information content for another. In such a
situation, there is a potentially large discrepancy between
the intrinsic and the realized information content of the
ornament with respect to one of the quality components.
As in the original model, this may lead to continual evo-
lution of female mating preferences along a limit cycle.
Even more complex behavior emerges when the orna-
ment has a low intrinsic information content for both
quality components. The realized information content of
the ornament can then differ from its intrinsic information
content in both aspects of quality. Much like the motion
of a double pendulum, this may result in a fundamentally
unpredictable dynamics of the female preference and the
male investment strategy. An example of this is given in
figure 5, where we show the evolution of female preference
for a pure epistatic indicator and the male investment
strategy in a model where male quality is determined by
two independent quality components.
Multiple Ornaments
The second extension of our model deals with the evo-
lution of multiple preferences and ornaments (reviewed
by Candolin [2003]). Male courtship displays often com-
prise multiple sexual signals, involving several behavioral
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Figure 5: Complex dynamics of an indicator for two distinct aspects of
quality. The advantage of evolving a preference varies with the investment
into the ornament by low-quality males (dashed with lowlinep males
quality for the first component; dot-dashed with low-qualitylinep males
for the second component). For each quality component separately, the
benefit of choice decreases when the realized information content of the
ornament drops. For the ornament as a whole, the information content
varies in a complex manner because of the fact that it serves as an
indicator for two quality components at the same time. Much like the
chaotic movement of a double pendulum, this results in an unpredictable
dynamics of the female preference. Parameters are a p a p a pAB aB Ab
, , , , , and5.0 b p b p b p 0.5 gp 0.05 m p m p 0.025 v p 1.0AB aB Ab A B AB
. Mutations in a male investment character had no pleio-v p v p 0.5aB Ab
tropic effects on other characters.
Figure 6: Preferences for two truly redundant signals. The figure shows
the evolution of two female preferences in a species with two male or-
naments. In the first 1,000 time units, female preference for the first
ornament (black line) reaches a stable equilibrium level (exactly as in fig.
1, top). After 1,000 time units, we introduce a small level of preference
for a second ornament. Although the second ornament has a lower in-
trinsic information content, female preference for the second ornament
(gray line) can increase. Both female preferences remain in the population.
Again, the system eventually attains a stable limit cycle. Parameters are
as in figure 1, top. The additional parameters for the second ornament
(see app. B in the online edition of the American Naturalist) are given
by , , , and .′ ′ ′ ′ ′a p 7.0 a p 6.0 b p b p 0.5 g p 0.08A a A a
attributes and/or morphological ornaments. The reasons
for this complexity are poorly understood. Theoretical
models indicate that the evolution of multiple preferences
is not straightforward. At first sight, females are expected
to evolve preference for the single indicator of quality with
the highest reliability, honesty, and detectability (Schluter
and Price 1993; Iwasa and Pomiankowski 1994), and they
should disregard ornaments that are less reliable, honest,
or detectable. This is especially true when there are epi-
static interactions between the costs of the different female
preferences such that the overall cost of choice is greatly
increased when females assess an additional male trait
(Iwasa and Pomiankowski 1994). We investigated one so-
lution to this problem and demonstrated that preferences
for multiple ornaments can evolve, even when exhibiting
multiple preferences is costly, as long as the ornaments
provide information about different aspects of genetic
quality or when they provide sufficiently independent es-
timates of overall genetic quality (van Doorn and Weissing
2004). In this article, we provide a second solution to the
problem: the nonequilibrium dynamics of preferences and
male investment may lead to the establishment of multiple
preferences even in situations where this is impossible in
evolutionary equilibrium.
An example of such a situation is given in figure 6. The
figure shows the evolution of two female preferences for
two male ornaments that both act as signals of genetic
quality (for details, see app. B). As in our original model,
genetic quality was assumed to be a one-dimensional
quantity. Hence, the ornaments did not act as signals for
distinct quality components, nor did they provide inde-
pendent estimates of genetic quality. What is more is that
the costs of choice were taken to combine in a super-
multiplicative manner such that the use of a second pref-
erence greatly increased the cost of mate choice. A careless
extrapolation of existing theory (Schluter and Price 1993;
Iwasa and Pomiankowski 1994; van Doorn and Weissing
2004) would therefore lead us to predict the evolution of,
at most, a single female preference. Yet, figure 6 clearly
demonstrates this prediction to be wrong.
In the simulation shown in figure 6, the parameters of
the first ornament are identical to those of the ornament
This content downloaded from 129.125.148.019 on November 12, 2018 07:22:51 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
Sexual Conflict and the Evolution of Female Preferences 755
in figure 1. For the first 1,000 time units, the simulation
therefore behaves exactly as the simulation shown in figure
1 (top): female preference for the first ornament (black
line) and male investment into that ornament (not shown)
approach a stable equilibrium level. After 1,000 time units,
we perturbed the system slightly by introducing a small
preference for the second ornament (gray line). The second
ornament is an ornament with a low intrinsic information
content. Females evolve a preference for this ornament
even though it is an inferior indicator of quality and even
though using multiple preferences is costly. The establish-
ment of the second ornament induces a continual change
in the relative information contents of the two ornaments.
This allows for the dynamical maintenance of both pref-
erences, notwithstanding the fact that existing theory pre-
cludes the stable maintenance of both preferences in an
evolutionary equilibrium.
The dynamical maintenance of a large number of or-
naments and preferences can be illustrated even more con-
vincingly when the two extended versions of our original
model are combined and generalized (app. B). A combined
model, where genetic quality is determined by several dis-
tinct quality components and where female mate choice
is based on an arbitrary number of ornaments and pref-
erences, allows for the maintenance of many ornaments
and preferences even when the number of quality com-
ponents is low. We observed the joint evolution of up to
20 ornaments and preferences in a model with just two
quality components, a result that bears analogy to the
dynamical coexistence of a large number of competing
species on just a few resources (Huisman and Weissing
1999). For the sake of clarity, a less dramatic example of
a simulation is provided as figure B1 in the online edition
of the American Naturalist.
Discussion
Existing theory on the evolution of mating preferences for
good-gene indicators concentrates on cases where female
preference and male ornament expression eventually attain
an evolutionary equilibrium. Yet, convergence on a stable
equilibrium, as observed by, for example, Iwasa and Pom-
iankowski (1999), Houle and Kondrashov (2002), and
Lorch et al. (2003), is not the only possible outcome of
the handicap process. Alternative dynamical outcomes in-
clude an evolutionary runaway for an increasingly strong
handicap trait (Iwasa and Pomiankowski 1994) and evo-
lutionary cycling (Iwasa and Pomiankowski 1999; Houle
and Kondrashov 2002). In this article, we investigated sex-
ual conflict over the information content of the signals
used in mate choice as a potential source of instabilities
in the handicap process. Our results indicate that the feed-
back between male condition-dependent signaling and
female mate choice strategies can easily be destabilized,
preventing the handicap process from ever reaching equi-
librium.
Well-established insights of sexual selection theory that
apply under equilibrium conditions need not necessarily
hold when the handicap process does not attain equilib-
rium. For example, although the stable exaggeration of a
costly female preference for a pure epistatic indicator (or
a sufficiently unreliable condition-dependent or revealing
handicap) is precluded under equilibrium conditions
(Iwasa et al. 1991), nonequilibrium dynamics may still
allow for the long-term dynamical persistence of such a
preference (fig. 4, area A; fig. 5). A similar word of caution
applies to the insight that females should evolve prefer-
ences for the single indicator of quality with the highest
reliability, honesty, and detectability and should disregard
ornaments that are inferior in these aspects (Schluter and
Price 1993), at least unless using an additional cue in mate
choice only weakly increases the cost of choice (Iwasa and
Pomiankowski 1994) or unless the ornaments provide in-
dependent information about distinct aspects of quality
(van Doorn and Weissing 2004). Indeed, figure 6 shows
the joint evolution of preferences for two ornaments in a
situation where the careless extrapolation of equilibrium
considerations would lead us to predict that females should
use only a single preference.
The oscillations of mate preference and male ornament
expression observed in our model superficially resemble
those observed in Fisherian models of sexual selection
(Iwasa and Pomiankowski 1995). Yet, the mechanism un-
derlying the oscillations is quite different in the two types
of models. The instability of Fisher’s process affects hand-
icap evolution only when the handicap process acts weakly
(Iwasa and Pomiankowski 1999). The instability is me-
diated by the genetic covariance between preference and
male trait expression, an evolutionary factor that, by as-
sumption, does not affect the dynamics in our model.
Instead, the present analysis concerns a complementary
regime where the impact of Fisher’s process on the evo-
lutionary dynamics is small relative to that of good-genes
sexual selection. In our model, instabilities are generated
by the handicap process itself, through the coevolution of
condition dependence and mating preference. Interest-
ingly, both the Fisherian and the good-genes model illus-
trate the importance of genetic constraints on the evo-
lutionary dynamics of secondary sexual characters. In both
these models, the stability of equilibria depends partially
on genetic details that affect the relative rates of evolution.
This illustrates that a purely phenotypic approach to the
modeling of sexual selection, without the appreciation of
genetic details, is inappropriate.
Apart from its theoretical consequences, the continual
evolution observed in our model is interesting in its own
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right. Wiens (2001) mentions the feedback between female
preference and male signaling as a possible explanation
for the apparent frequent turnover and loss of sexually
selected traits, arguing that female preference for an or-
nament (and, hence, the corresponding ornament itself)
will disappear as soon as males manage to express their
ornaments regardless of their genetic quality. As illustrated
by figure B1, the evolution of multiple ornaments and
preferences can indeed lead to expression patterns of sex-
ual characters that are highly variable and dynamic on the
phylogenetic timescale. In addition, the model provides
an alternative mechanism for divergence of sexually se-
lected traits between allopatric populations (Schluter and
Price 1993). This may be of relevance in the context of
speciation. Third, the model captures some aspects of the
ideas originally developed by Hill (1994), who suggests
sexual conflict in the evolution of quality indicators to be
responsible for the elaboration of male signals from their
initial rudimentary form to larger or more complex man-
ifestations of the ornament. According to this idea, females
are forced to assess additional and novel ornament features
in order to still be able to estimate the quality of the male
whenever the information content of male advertisement
decreases. This may result in an evolutionary race, where
a correlation between male ornament expression and male
genetic quality can be maintained only through the estab-
lishment of increasingly complex female mating prefer-
ences and increasingly elaborate male ornaments (Hill
1994).
When Should We Expect Nonequilibrium Dynamics of
Preferences and Indicator Traits?
The question of whether the continual evolution of pref-
erences and good-gene indicators is a biologically relevant
evolutionary phenomenon ultimately remains an empir-
ical one. On the basis of our analysis, we can, however,
give a number of conditions under which sexual conflict
over the information content of ornaments is most likely
to affect the evolutionary dynamics.
First, males should be able to change their investment
into the ornament according to their genetic quality. In-
stabilities leading to continual evolution are more likely
when the investment strategies of high- and low-quality
males can evolve independently or when the genetic ar-
chitecture of the ornament tends to enlarge the differences
between high- and low-quality males (fig. 4B). Different
assumptions on the genetic basis of condition dependence
will lead to a different mutational (co)variance structure,
and we surmise that such differences can explain why evo-
lutionary cycling has been observed in some models
(Houle and Kondrashov 2002) but not in others (Iwasa
and Pomiankowski 1994; Lorch et al. 2003). Second, dis-
crepancies between the realized and intrinsic information
content of the ornament should not be too costly. This
requires that the ornament is a poor indicator of quality
and that the intrinsic information content of the ornament
is low (fig. 4C). In this case, females cannot easily detect
low-quality males. Also, males that invest less than the
optimal value do not suffer disproportionately from re-
duced attractiveness. Consequently, there can be a dis-
crepancy between the realized and the intrinsic content of
the ornament without this resulting in strong selection on
males to realize their optimal level of investment. Third,
discrepancies between the realized and intrinsic infor-
mation content of the ornament should persist for suffi-
cient lengths of time such that female preference can reach
a high value before males attain their optimal investment
strategy. This requires that the rate of male evolution is
low relative to the rate of female evolution. Whether this
will actually be the case depends on genetic details and on
the intensity of selection on the male and female sexual
characters.
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